Anais EnAJUS 2021
ISSN 2674-8401
Unclogging Courts by Targeting Litigant Incentives: The Case of the Brazilian Labor Justice Reform
Autoria: Caio Castelliano, Peter Grajzl, Eduardo Watanabe
Informações
Sessão Online 03 - 25/10/2021, Das 7h00 às 8h50 (Horário de Brasília) Das 11h às 12h50 (Horário de Portugal)
Mediação: Caio Castelliano (Universidade de Brasília)
Resumo
Overburdened courts are a major obstacle to effective administration of justice in many countries, with corresponding adverse consequences for the impacted societies and economies. Conventional reform efforts that aim to reduce court backlogs and delays by increasing judicial staffing are costly and generally ineffective. When new judges are hired, the pressure over incumbent judges decreases, judicial productivity decreases, and court total output remains roughly the same (Beenstock and Haitovsky, 2004; Dimitrova-Grajzl et. al. 2012; Grajzl 2016). The question of what constitutes a viable and effective court reform thus is a highly topical one.
Palavras-chave
Courts; fee-shifting; court demand; judicial productivity; BrazilPDF Todos os trabalhos desta edição